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(b.) racially desegregating high-schools decreases the overall smoking prevalence, (c.)
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1 Introduction
Arguably human beings are both products and creators of their social environments, the
collection of relationships individuals engage in. Although the influence of individuals’ social
environments on their socio-economic choices has been widely studied, perhaps surprisingly,
the possibility that the converse influence is also in place—humans’ behaviors shape their
social environment—has been overlooked. Substantively, recognizing that friendships are
part of one’s choice offers a novel perspective on the mode of operation of social conformity
pressures1, and on the economic (and statistical) analysis and evaluation of public policies.
More specifically, it shifts the focus from questions such as how the social network propagates
changes in individuals’ behaviors, say, due to a policy change, to questions such as how the
social network responds to policies targeting human behaviors.
While individuals may selfishly choose their optimal behaviors, aiming to maximize their
individual utility (Nash, 1950), they commit to relationships that result from communication,
coordination, and cooperation (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). The tension between the in-
stinct for selfish choices and the consensual nature of humans’ friendships can be prototyped
as a game of link and node statuses, and this paper contributes the understanding of this
environment: (i) by proposing a novel formulation of individuals’ decision problem and a
family of equilibria that capture both the selfish nature of individuals’ strategic interactions
and the consensual nature of human relationships; (ii) by obtaining both ordinal and cardinal
probabilistic ranking of these equilibria which ranking has broader implications, including for
both the estimation of and simulations from the proposed model; (iii) by presenting empir-
ical evidence that: (a.) the response of the friendship network to increases in tobacco price
amplifies the intended policy effect on smoking, (b.) racially desegregating high-schools via
stimulating the social interaction of students, each with a different intrinsic propensity to
smoke, decreases the overall prevalence of smoking, (c.) the response of the social network
is quantitatively important in assessing the aggregate spillovers upon changes in behavior
of a subset of the population, (d.) the estimation biases when the network externalities are
mis-specified and when peer effects are omitted are of the same sign.
Individuals’ behaviors and relationships materialize fundamentally different decision pro-
cesses. Whereas for an individual to engage in a certain behavior she need not consider any
but her own incentives, for a relationship to emerge and be sustained, there needs to be a
consensus between both parties. The consensual nature of human relationships places partic-
ular restrictions, which I term stability constraints, on the outcome of individuals’ decisions
to engage in a given behavior or in a given relationship. Simply put, individuals confine their
choices of friendships to those for which there is a mutual consent.
Given an agent’s incentives, her observed links and behaviors are likely to compare favor-
1Instead of yielding to peer pressure, individuals may alter their friendships.
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ably against her alternatives, i.e., are likely to be robust against a set of feasible deviations.
Reasoning about the complexity of individuals’ decision problem2 motivates a family of equi-
libria indexed by the diameter of permissible deviations. For a population of size n, Nash
equilibrium in a k(-player) stable network (NEkSN) is a configuration of links and node sta-
tuses in which no player has a profitable deviation when contemplating his action status and
a subset of k − 1 of his links, given, of course, the stability constraints for this subset. For
k < n, NEkSN is less demanding on the players in comparison with a Nash play (i.e., when
k = n) and is, therefore, a more tenable assumption in large populations.
Friends’ influences have often been pointed to as a major driver of human behaviors and
have been associated with the potential to create a domino effect.3 The main premise of
this study is that it is possible a converse mechanism to be in place in which a change in
individual A’s decisions re-shapes who her peers are as opposed to pressuring her peers to
follow her decisions; e.g., an individual who contemplates ceasing smoking (after an increase
in tobacco prices) may at the same time reconsider her friendship network! This motivates a
model in which individuals decide on both their friendships and their behaviors (decision to
smoke). Importantly, this model ought to acknowledge the possible externalities on the one
hand between smokers and their peers, e.g. peer effects, and on the other hand among peers
themselves. Externalities, in turn, give raise to multiplicity of equilibria.
The k-player consensual dynamic (kCD) is a family of myopic dynamic processes where
every period an individual meets k−1 potential friends and decides whether or not to befriend
each of them as well as whether or not to revise her action choice. In the presence of random
preference shocks, the kCD family induces a stationary distribution over the entire set of
possible outcomes, which embeds the family of NEkSN in an intuitive way (each NEkSN is k-
neighborhood local mode of the stationary distribution) and which, because of its invariance
to k, ranks probabilistically each equilibrium within the family, even for different k-s. In
addition to the cardinal ranking, analysis of the k-CD independently delivers, as a by-product,
a re-affirmative ordinal ranking of these equilibria. The larger k is, the faster kCDs approach
the stationary distribution, i.e., the more likely the stationary distribution is to represent
those kCDs, and the more probable the rest points of these kCDs (and of course, NEkSN
states) are.4
The convergence properties of kCDs have immediate implications for the implementation
of the proposed model. The model’s likelihood is given by the (unique) stationary distribution
of the kCD family. This distribution pertains to the Exponential Random Graph Models5,
2There are 2n−1 possible link deviations and only n− 1 possible one-link-at-a-time link deviations.
3This effect is also known as bandwagon effect or social multiplier. See the pioneering study of Leibenstein
(1950) and, for a comprehensive treatment, the volume in Benhabib, Bisin and Jackson (2010).
4See Nash (1950), Foster and Young (1990), Kandori et al. (1993); Blume (1993); Jackson and Watts
(2002). Some of the ideas I exploit are encountered in Cournot (1838, Chapter VII).
5See Frank and Strauss (1986); Wasserman and Pattison (1996)
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for which both direct estimation and simulating from the model with known parameters are
computationally infeasible.6 For these models, the double Metropolis-Hastings sampler offers
a Bayesian estimation strategy that nevertheless relies on simulations from the stationary
distribution via Markov chains.7 The kCD family has varying convergence rates, indexed by
k, which in turn suggest a transparent strategy for designing these Markov chains.8
The model is estimated with data on smoking behavior, friendship networks, and home
environment (parental education background and parental smoking behavior) from the Na-
tional Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health.9 This is a longitudinal study of a nationally
representative sample of adolescents in the United States, who were in grades 7–12 during
the 1994–95 school year.
1.1 Conclusions from the empirical analysis
The estimation exercise reveals the role of network data availability for the analysis of de-
terminants of teen risky activities. In particular, ignoring the existence of peer effect or
miss-specifying the externalities in the network formation lead to larger biases in estimat-
ing the price coefficient compared to when social network is kept fixed or network data is
not available. When comparing the estimates for other determinants of adolescent smoking
(presence of a smoker in the household or maternal education) the estimation biases when the
network externalities are mis-specified and when peer effects are omitted are of the same sign.
This observation is robust to alternative specification where instead of price on smoking, the
income (allowances) are included.
Counterfactual experiments with the estimated model quantify the response of the friend-
ship network in various settings. The first experiment asks whether this response is relevant
for policies working through changes in tobacco prices. To motivate this exercise compare
how individuals respond to a price increase in fixed versus endogenous network environments.
There are two effects to consider. The direct effect of changing tobacco prices is the first or-
der response and, intuitively, will be larger whenever individuals are free to change their
friendships, i.e. more individuals are likely to immediately respond to changes in tobacco
prices provided they are not confined to their (smoking) friends. The indirect (ripple) effect
of changing tobacco prices is the effect on smoking which is due, in part, to the fact that
one’s friends have stopped smoking. Contrary to before, a fixed network propels the indirect
effect, e.g. an individual who changes her smoking status is bound to exert pressure to her
friends (most likely smokers) and, thus, likely to alter her friends’ decisions to smoke. It is,
6An evaluation of the likelihood involves a summation with 2(n
2+n)/2 terms, e.g. for n = 10, 255 terms.
7See Murray et al. (2006), Liang (2010), and Mele (2017).
8Poor convergence properties are associated with local Markov chains, where each update is of size o(n)
(Bhamidi et al., 2011). The novelty here is sampling with varying k, on the support {2, . . . , n− 1}, speeding
the convergence of the proposed algorithm. I thank a referee for pointing to me this direction.
9Details about the Add Health data, including the sample construction, are in the appendix.
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then, an empirical question how these two opposing effects balance out. Simulations with
the estimated model suggest that the direct effect dominates, i.e. that following an increase
in tobacco prices the response of the friendship network amplifies the intended policy effects
this increase.
The second experiment asks whether school racial composition has effect on adolescent
smoking. When students from different racial backgrounds study in the same school, they
interact and are likely to become friends. Being from different racial backgrounds student have
different intrinsic propensity to smoke and the question is what is the equilibrium behavior
in these mixed-race friendships–those who do not smoke start smoking or those who smoke
stop smoking. Simulations from the model suggest that redistributing students from racially
segregated schools into racially balanced schools decreases the overall smoking prevalence.
The last experiment examines a school from the sample with a particularly high smoking
prevalence (45%). The experiment simulates a policy intervention, capable of influencing
students’ smoking decisions10, however, targeting only part of this school’s population. The
(empirical) question of interest is when treated individuals return in the schools, will their
friends follow their example, i.e. extending the effect of the proposed policy beyond the set of
treated individuals and thus creating a domino effect, or will their, previous to the treatment,
friends un-friend them? In essence this is a question about the magnitude of the spillover
effects and this paper contribution is to account for the possibility of the friendship network
to adjust to the proposed treatment. This study suggests that this spillover effect is in the
neighborhood of 5 folds.
1.2 Related literature
The empirical models in Nakajima (2007) and Mele (2017) inspired the proposed framework.
Nakajima (2007) studies peer effects abstracting from friendships and Mele (2017) obtains
large network asymptotics of a model with link formation only. The approaches in these
papers are fundamentally compatible so these models can be unified in a joint model, as
in Hsieh and Lee (2014), Boucher (2016) and Hsieh et al. (2016). Compared to existing
frameworks, including Cabrales et al. (2011a) and Canen et al. (2016), I departure from
purely non-cooperative formulations of individuals’ decision problem. More specifically, the
proposed solution concept embeds the necessity for consensus for forming a relationship
(Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996).
A handful of theoretical papers consider (broadly related) adaptive link dynamics or
model both network formation along with other choices potentially affected by the network
(See Jackson and Watts, 2002; Goyal and Vega-Redondo, 2005; Cabrales et al., 2011b; Hiller,
10The policy may consists of providing direct incentives or information about the health risks associated
with smoking tobacco. Then, it may be too expensive to treat the entire school and, instead, the policy maker
may engage only a small part of the school with the purpose to alter the social norms.
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2012; Ko¨nig et al., 2014; Baetz, 2015; Lager˚as and Seim, 2016). For example Ko¨nig et al.
(2014) obtain a characterization, later generalized by Lager˚as and Seim (2016), of the Nash
equilibria in our model as nested split graphs—graphs where nodes’ neighborhoods have strict
hierarchical structures, i.e. a node’s neighborhood contains the neighborhoods of all nodes
with lower degrees. Similar results are obtained by Hiller (2012) in the context of 2-player
stable networks.1112 Importantly, the theoretical frameworks available, are meant to provide
focused insights into isolated features of networks and deliver sharp predictions, but are not
easily adapted for the purposes of estimation.13
Potential function representation as a dimensionality reduction tool is widely used in
(algorithmic) game theory, computer science and in economics of networks for processes on
fixed networks, for processes of link formation and, more recently, for combined processes,
e.g. Foster and Young (1990), Blume (2003), Jackson and Watts (2002), Nakajima (2007),
Bramoulle´ et al. (2014), Bourle´s et al. (2017), Mele (2017), Boucher (2016), Hsieh and Lee
(2014), Hsieh et al. (2016).14 In the proposed framework, the role of the potential func-
tion is to justify the gravitation of a family of adaptive dynamics around equilibria of the
link/behavior game. This study also suggest a direction for addressing the poor statistical
properties of those models.15
Econometric models of networks and actions are proposed in Goldsmith-Pinkham and
Imbens (2013) and Hsieh and Lee (2014) where the decisions to form friendships influence
the decision to engage in a particular activity. The focus of their research, however, is not on
policy analysis nor on accounting for the possible endogenous response of the friendship net-
work to changing the decision environment. Thus, they are able to abstract from the converse
feedback from actions to friendship formation and, also, to avoid the equilibrium microfoun-
dations of a strategic model and an explicit treatment of the possibility for multiplicity. In
contrast, the framework proposed in Boucher (2016) is microfounded as a particular equi-
librium in a non-cooperative model of friendships and behaviors. Related work by Hsieh et
al. (2016) propose a two-stage estimation procedure, with an application to R and D, which
relies on conditional independence of links delivered by abstracting from link externalities.
11An analogous characterization of the family of NEkSN should be of independent interest. Given the focus
of this paper, I leave this for another occasion.
12In similar settings Jackson and Watts (2002) and Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) obtain conditions
under which the risk-dominant or the efficient action prevails when they analyze similar dynamic processes
(as opposed to the equilibrium networks).
13A typical approach is to focus the analysis on a particular equilibrium as opposed to discussing all equi-
libria. Multiplicity of equilibria reflects the possibility of network and behavioral externalities which is an
indispensable feature of our settings.
14Congestion games were the first class of games exhibiting this property (Beckmann, McGuire and Winsten,
1956; Rosenthal, 1973). Monderer and Shapley (1996) recognize that congestion games are instances of
games with potential, propose several notions of potential functions for games in strategic form, and obtain a
characterization of potential games.
15This is an important point for the implementation of those models. For more background, see the discus-
sion in Bhamidi et al. (2011) and Chandrasekhar and Jackson (2016).
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Auerbach (2016) obtains identification results within large network asymptotics which also
rely on conditional independence of links. While the assumptions leading to conditional in-
dependence present a convenience, these limit the scope for studying peer effects, in addition
ruling out externalities in the network formation.16 Finally, there are recent contributions
to the econometrics literature which focus on link formation, though these are not easily
extendable to include action choice as well.17
The theoretical analysis in Jackson (2018) argues that variability in individuals’ popularity
(degree in a social network) leads to biased perceptions for the social norm which in turn
leads to higher levels of activities compared to a situation when there is no variability in
individuals’ popularity.18 Although the model in this paper is different in that individuals
choose their friends and I exploit different information assumptions, one of my counterfactual
experiments hints to such amplification mechanisms (in quite different settings) where as a
result of the endogenous response of the social network to a price increase the intended effects
on the overall smoking are amplified.
The empirical analysis of friendship networks and smoking behaviors lends support to a
host of results which are related to the large body of empirical work on social interactions and
teen risky behaviors. Typically, empirical studies on peer effects either lack data on friendship
network or take the friendship network as given.19 Also the approaches range from models
that directly relate an individual’s choices to mean characteristics of his peer groups20 to
models with elaborate equilibrium micro-foundations, such as those in Brock and Durlauf
(2001, 2007); Krauth (2005); Calvo´-Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou (2009). In terms of
estimates, this paper makes the first step in explaining how not accounting for the response
of these social network (e.g. as a result of lack of data) could bias the estimates.21 Similarly,
this paper pioneers a mechanism capable of explaining the role of the school composition, or
more generally the determinants of the social fabric, on the overall teen risky behaviors. The
possibility of such a role was theorized by Graham et al. (2014) and experimentally discovered
by Carrell et al. (2013).22
16It is important to realize that network economics owes its appeal namely because networks conceptualize
so naturally situations with externalities, so ruling these out in essence defies the use of network economics.
17See Sheng (2014), Chandrasekhar and Jackson (2016), Leung (2014), de Paula et al. (2016), Graham
(2017), Menzel (2015) and the reviews in Chandrasekhar (2015); de Paula (2016); Bramoulle´ et al. (2016).
18This increase is further amplified if the most popular individuals are those with the highest proclivity for
extreme behaviors.
19See, for example, Liu et al. (2014), who distinguish between local aggregate and local average peer effects,
and the references therein.
20See Powell et al. (2005), Ali and Dwyer (2009a), and the references therein.
21It is difficult, if not impossible, to account the empirical contributions of the large literature on peer effects
and teen risky behaviors. For a small sample of papers obtaining estimates of peer effects see Chaloupka and
Wechsler (1997), Ali and Dwyer (2009b) and the references in (CDC, 2000, Surgeon General’s Report).
22It is important to recognize that this study has limitations. The presence of unobservables which affect
both individuals’ propensity to smoke and also the friendship decisions, in principle, could influence the
model’s predictions (See Manski (1993) and the discussion in Blume et al. (2015).) While the model can
be augmented to accommodate an extension along these lines, identification of model’s parameters becomes
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2 A game on an endogenous network
The model captures two primitives of a (strategic) environment where individuals choose
both their behaviors and their relationships jointly. First, individuals’ behaviors and rela-
tionships materialize fundamentally different decision processes. While for an individual to
engage in a certain behavior she need not consider any but her own incentives, for a rela-
tionship to emerge and sustain there needs to be a consensus between both parties. At the
same time, the incentives which substantiate individuals’ relationship decisions remain self-
ish (and asymmetric), so that pure strategies and payoff functions remain appropriate means
for mathematical description of the game. To reflect the consensual nature of human rela-
tionships, I augment the individual’s decision problem with stability constraints. The point
is that, in contemplating their optimal play, individuals are aware that were the stability
constraint violated, a relationship cannot be established.23
The second primitive of the model is the presence of externalities for which, indeed,
models of network formation are well suited for. These externalities exist not only within the
relationships per se, but also between the action decisions and the relationships. Externalities
between relationships stem from the motives for sharing common friends or, alternatively,
the motives for exclusivity of a relationship. In addition, externalities between individuals’
behaviors and relationships reflect the motives for conformism with friends behaviors or,
conversely, the motives to associate with those who share common habits.
The model is developed in two stages. First, agents’ strategic behavior is analyzed in
static settings and then a family of myopic dynamic processes is used to approximate the
predictions of the static model in a inferentially suitable way.
2.1 Players and preferences
Each individual (say i), in a finite population N = {1, 2, ..., n}, decides on a binary action
ai ∈ {0, 1} and her social network, given by the set of her relationships gij = gji ∈ {0, 1}
for j 6= i. For the empirical application, N is the collection of all student cohorts in a given
high school at a given time period, where ai = 1 if student i smokes and gij = 1 if there is a
friendship between i and j.24
Agent i selects her friendship and action statuses S(i) = (ai, {gij}j 6=i) from her choice set
S(i) to maximize her payoff, which depends both on her exogenous characteristics Xi, e.g.
age, gender, etc, and on her endogenous characteristics, e.g. network position, decision of her
delicate and frequentist and Bayesian perspectives differ substantially on this issue. Since I do not want to
exploit the disagreement between those perspectives, I discuss this point only briefly and leave it for future
research.
23In essence, the stability constraints embed the consensual nature of the pairwise stability of Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996).
24Alternatively, N could be the population of a geographically isolated area. In general, any closed collection
of individuals who draw friends from within themselves will fit the assumptions of the model.
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network neighbors, and etc. Let S = (S(1), . . . , S(n)) ∈
∏
i S(i) = S andX = (X1, ..., Xn) ∈ X.
Formally i’s payoff function, ui : S×X −→ R, orders the outcomes in S given X:
ui(S,X) = aivi +
∑
j
gijwij + qijk
∑
j,k
j<k
gijgjkgki
︸ ︷︷ ︸
clustering/rivalry
(1)
+ aih
∑
j
aj︸ ︷︷ ︸
aggr. externalities
+φ
∑
j
gij(aiaj + (1− ai)(1− aj))︸ ︷︷ ︸
local externalities
(2)
Here vi = v(Xi), wij = w(Xi, Xj) and qijk = q(Xi, Xj , Xk) are functions of agents’ (exoge-
nous) characteristics.
Note that the incremental payoff of changing i’s action status, ∆aiui(S,X) = ui(ai =
1, S−i, X) − ui(ai = 0, S−i, X), depends on i’s observables, her friendship links, and the
choices of the overall population. The coefficient vi captures the possibility that the intrinsic
preferences over different action statuses may depend on an agent’s attributes. The coefficient
φ in aiajgij captures conformity pressures.
25 In the case of friendships, one may be influenced
strongly by the behavior of own friends as opposed to casual individuals. Continuing, h in
the second summation captures the aggregate externalities: i may be influenced from the
behaviors of the surrounding population, irrespective of whether these are friends or not.26
Consider the incremental payoff of a friendship, ∆gijui(S,X) = ui(gij = 1, S−ij , X) −
ui(gij = 0, S−ij , X). In that incremental payoff, the term wij captures the baseline benefit of
friendship which may depend on i’s and j’s degree of similarity, i.e., same sex, gender, race,
etc. The terms with qijk capture link externalities. Mechanically, if j links to k and k links
to i then i may be more likely link to j (thus closing the triangle). On the contrary, if there
is friendship rivalry these forces will have the opposite effect, i.e. q will be negative.
It is important to emphasize that the labels of the terms in (1) are figurative and are
only meant to draw intuition from well-recognized, in the literature on social interactions,
identification concerns. While friends influences have often been pointed to as a major driver
of human behaviors and have been associated with the potential to create a domino effect,
the main premise of this paper is that it it possible a converse mechanism to be in place
where a change of i’s decisions re-shapes who her peers are as opposed to pressure her peers
to follow i’s decisions, e.g. an individual who contemplates ceasing smoking (after an increase
of tobacco prices) may at the same time reconsider her friendship network!
25This is an example of positive externality. Alternatively, the local externality term may capture compet-
itive pressures, in which case this term may have a negative sign.
26In principle, h could be a function of individual’s exogenous attributes capturing, for example, a situation
where males are more likely to be affected by the observed behavior of other males as opposed to the observed
behavior of females.
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2.2 Equilibrium play
There is a tension between the selfish nature of humans’ behaviors, aiming to (selfishly)
maximize individual’s utility, and the consensual nature of humans’ friendships calling for
cooperative decisions. I assume that players internalize the necessity for consensus by con-
fining their choices to the stability constraints.27
Definition 1 (NEkSN) A profile of actions and a network S∗ = ({a∗i }i∈I , {g∗ij}i∈I,j∈I\i) is
a Nash equilibrium in a k(-player) stable network, provided S∗(i) = (a
∗
i , {g∗ij}j 6=i) is a
solution of i′s decision problem on Ik ⊆ I:
maxai,{gij}j∈Ik\i ui(ai, {gij}j∈I\i;S
∗
−i) (3)
s.t. gij = 1 only if ∆gijuj(ai, {gij}j∈I\i;S∗−i) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Ik\i (4)
where 1 < k ≤ n, Ik = {i} ∪ {i1, . . . , ik−1} and i /∈ {i1, . . . , ik−1}, for all i and Ik.
In particular, in a NEkSN no player has permissible, by the stability constraints (4),
and profitable deviations in any restriction of the game on k nodes.
In a NEkSN, individual’s play is optimal with respect to a reference set of contemplated
strategies and the size of this reference set depends on k. In equilibrium, no player has
permissible, by the stability constraints (4), and profitable deviations in any restriction of the
game on k nodes.
Assumption 1 Assume that w() and q() are symmetric in their arguments.
Proposition 1 With the utilities in (1)
1. For any S, k, i and Ik, the problem in (3-4) is well defined and has a solution.
2. For any k, NEkSN exists.
In proposition 1, the existence of a non-trivial solution to the individual’s decision problem
in (3-4) and an equilibrium is guaranteed by the potential representation for this game. The
proof is in appendix A (p. 27).
Proposition 2 With the utilities in (1)
1. For k = 2, NEkSNs are pairwise stable;
2. For k = n, NEkSNs are pairwise-Nash networks28;
27Stability constraints bear similarities with incentive compatibility constraints from the theory of mecha-
nism design, which have been discussed as early as Hurwicz (1960, 1972).
28See Calvo´-Armengol (2004), Goyal and Joshi (2006), Bloch and Jackson (2006, 2007).
10
3. The equilibria in the NEkSN family are ordered by set inclusion, i.e. NEk′SN ⊆ NEkSN
for k′ > k′.
For k = 2, any NEkSN play is robust against a single link deviation and whence pairwise
stable.29 The larger k is, the more elaborate deviations individuals contemplate when choos-
ing an optimal play. In our settings, for k = n, NEkSNs are Nash networks. Further, pairwise
stability is interpreted as a necessary condition for the existence of a NEkSN (proposition 2
part 3). The proof is in appendix A (p. 28).
3 k-player dynamic and a random utility framework
As is typical for an equilibrium, NEkSNs present an intuitive way to conceptualize the out-
come of the (non-cooperative and cooperative) forces which drive action and relationship
statuses in our model, without specifying the decision process leading to this outcome. This
abstraction is challenged by two primitives of our settings: (a.) the complexity of agent’s
decision problem due to the size of her action space and (b.) the possibility for multiple
equilibria due to the presence of externalities. Turning to a framework based on adaptive
dynamics simplifies agents’ decision process and delivers a way to embed the multiplicity of
NEkSN in an inferentially convenient way.
The formulation of individuals’ decision problem (3-4) provides a basis for an adaptive
process describing the evolution of networks towards (or around) NEkSNs. The proposed
dynamic builds on Nash (1950), who suggested that equilibrium might arise from simple
(myopic) adaptive dynamic as opposed to from a complex reasoning process, and Jackson and
Watts (2002), who in the context of network evolution, introduced the notion of “improving
paths” in which the adaptive dynamic is consensual and moves incrementally.30 31
3.1 k-player consensual dynamic (k-CD)
Every period t = 1, 2, . . . a randomly chosen individual (say i) reconsiders k − 1 < n of her
friendships {i1, . . . , ik−1} and her behavior ai. In particular, i myopically solves her decision
problem on Ik = {i} ∪ {i1, . . . , ik−1} from (3–4), i.e. i can not establish a relationship with
j unless j ∈ Ik and ∆gijuj ≥ 0. A stochastic meeting process µt outputs who makes choices
and who are the individuals considered as potential friends. Formally:
Pr (µt = (i, Ik) |St−1, X) = µi,Ik (St−1, X) (5)
29This holds for any payoffs.
30See also Cournot (1838); Blume (1993).
31In Jackson and Watts (2002), each period a pair of players meet and update the status of their relationship
(a single link of theirs), while in the literature studying the myopic best reply dynamic, agents take turns to
update their strategies (i.e., in our settings, all links). The proposed dynamic spans these approaches.
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The sequence of meetings and players’ optimal decisions induce a sequence of network
states (St), which is indexed by time subscript t and which will be referred as k-player
consensual dynamic (k-PCD).32
Assumption 2 Any meeting is possible Pr (µt = (i, Ik−1)|S,X) > 0 for all i ∈ I, Ik 6= ∅,
S ∈ S and X ∈ X.
Proposition 3 Let 1 < k ≤ n and suppose that assumption 2 holds then
1. Any S ∈ NEkSN is absorbing i.e. if St ∈ NEkSN then St′ = St for all t′ > t.
2. Independently of the initial condition (distribution) Pr (limt→∞ St ∈ NEkSN) = 1.
Indeed the NEkSNs are exactly the rest points of a simple decision process, the k-PCDs.
The proof is in Appendix A (p. 28).
3.2 A random utility framework
The assumption below introduces to this discrete choice problem a random preference shock.33
Assumption 3 Suppose that the utilities in (1) contain a random preference shock. More
specifically, let
ui(S,X) = ui(S,X) + S
with S ∼ i.i.d. across time and network states. Moreover, suppose that  has c.d.f. and
unbounded support on R.
Assumption 4 Suppose that the preference shock  is distributed Gumbel(µ, β).
Assumption 5 Suppose that for the meeting probability µ: (i) Pr(µt = (i, Ik)) does not
depend on the relationship status between i and any j ∈ Ik. (ii) Pr(µt = (i, Ik)) does not
depend on ai. These together imply µi,Ik(S,X) = µi,Ik(S
′, X) for all S = (S(i|Ik), S−(i|Ik))
and S′ = (S′(i|Ik), S−(i|Ik)).
32In the simplest case, any meeting is equally probable so that: µi,Ik (St−1, X) = n
−11/
(
n−1
k
)
. Note that
in large networks the meetings may be biased towards people with similar characteristics (or people sharing
friends) as in Currarini et al. (2009). Such meetings will result in the presence of triangles on the friendship
network. My approach is to place little structure on the meeting process and, instead, to include a triangle-
motive directly in the utility function. In this study the school networks are of relatively small size–in compact
social spaces everybody is likely to have met everybody else so that the meeting frictions are less likely to
influence the patters of friendships.
33See Thurstone (1927); Marschak (1960); McFadden (1974). Similar stochastic has been considered by the
literature on stochastic stability, which when shocks vanish over time, presents an equilibrium selection device.
See Foster and Young (1990); Kandori et al. (1993).
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The matching process {µt}∞t=1 and the sequence of optimal choices, in terms of friends
selection and individual actions, induce a Markov chain of network configurations on S.34
The above assumption guarantees that this chain obeys some desirable properties, which are
formalized below. (The proof is in the appendix on p. 28.)
Theorem 1 [Stationary distribution] Let 1 < k ≤ n and suppose assumptions 2 and 3
hold. The Markov chain generated by the kCD has the following properties:
1. There exists a unique stationary distribution pik ∈ ∆(S) for which limt→∞ Pr(St = S) =
pik(S). In addition, for any function f : S→ R, 1T
∑T
t=0 f(St) −→
∫
f (S) dpik.
2. Under assumptions 2-5:
pik(S,X) ∝ exp
(P(S,X)
β
)
(6)
In particular, pik(S,X) does not depend on k.
The first part is not surprising in that it asserts that kCD is well behaved so that standard
convergence results apply. The uniqueness of pik precludes any ambiguity in the predictions
of the process, while the ergodicity is relevant whenever we want to draw predictions from
the model. However, the second part of the theorem has novel implications.
Note how in (1) the stationary distribution does not depend on k and, thus, delivers an
approach to unify the family of NEkSN. As we formally argue in theorem 3, the stationary
distribution offers a probabilistic ranking of the set equilibria in the NEkSN family (within
and across different ks). In addition, the closed-form expression for the stationary distribution
has advantages for the empirical implementation of the proposed framework, where pik can
be treated as the likelihood. In particular, one can explore a transparent argument for the
identification of model’s parameters. It is clear that, given the variation in the data of
individual choices {ai}ni=1, friendships {gij}ni,j=1 and attributes {Xi}ni=1, functional forms for
v, w,m, h, q will be identified as long as the different parameters induce different likelihoods
of the data. Also, a closed-form expression for pik facilitates the use of likelihood-based
estimation methods, including Bayesian ones.35
Our next results hints to the role of the dimension of the meeting process k in the k-player
dynamic. Our formulation is for the most stark case when k is the only factor differentiating
the properties of the k-player dynamic.36 The proof is in appendix A (p. 29).
34See the stochastic-choice dynamics in Blume (1993).
35To provide intuition behind this result consider two states S, S′ ∈ S. It can be shown that the probability
of moving from S to S′ is proportional to the probability of returning from S′ to S by a factor that does not
depend on k. The formal argument can be found in the appendix.
36In general, the shape of the potential, i.e. the terms of the potential function, and the geography of the
network will likely influence the speed of convergence. For more see Bhamidi et al. (2011). As far as I know
treatment of the most general case remains out of reach.
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Theorem 2 [k-PD ranking] Suppose that P(S) = c for all S ∈ Sn. For 2 ≤ k < k′ ≤ n,
the k′CD converges strictly faster than k-CD to the stationary equilibrium pi. In particular,
the second eigen value of kCD is given by
λk,[2] =
1
n
(
n− 1 + n− k
n− 1
)
(7)
There are two rationales behind the pursuit of a characterization of the speed of conver-
gence of kCD. As anticipated (and formally established shortly) pik probabilistically ranks the
family of NEkSN. In a dual fashion, the differential speed of convergence provides a means
to rank probabilistically the family of kCD.37 Theorem 2 suggests that for large ks, kCD
converge faster and the NEkSN, to which these kCD converge, have higher probability.
The second reason for why studying how well the kCD is represented by the stationary
distribution pik is highlighted by Bhamidi et al. (2011) who showed that adaptive dynamic
with local updates converges very slowly.38 Note that kCD encompasses not only local
updates, e.g. k = [n/2], and thus offers a way to address the problem of slow convergence
(poor approximation). In addition, theorem 2 offers insights into an important trade-off for
sampling design: the Markov chain is facing a trade-off between speed of convergence and
complexity in simulating the next step. Whenever k is small, the speed of convergence to
the stationary distribution is slower, however, the computational difficulty in updating the
network at each step is smaller. The opposite holds when k is large.39
3.3 Discussion
3.3.1 Probabilistic ranking and long-run equilibria
The stationary distribution obtained in theorem 1 gives an intuitive (probabilistic) ranking of
the family of NEkSN. Under pi, a network state will receive a positive probability, although
it may not be an equilibrium in any sense. It will be desirable, however, that in the vicinity
of an equilibrium, the equilibrium to receive the highest probability. Relatedly, the mode of
pi (i.e. the state with the highest probability) has special role. This offers a new perspective
to the theoretical results on equilibrium selection from evolutionary game theory, namely
equilibrium ranking.
37In our case the speed of convergence is shaped by how powers of the transient matrix map any initial
state to the eigenvector with eigenvalue one. All eigen values except one are strictly less than 1 so that the
limiting behavior of this exponentiation is governed by the second eigenvalue.
38A Markov chain is local if at most o(n) links are updated at a time. See also the discussion in Chan-
drasekhar and Jackson (2016).
39While this is true in general, the particular structure of the problem here permits computational shortcuts
where, for each k, the cost of updating the Markov chain is constant.
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To formalize our discussion, define the neighborhood N ⊂ S of S ∈ S as:
N =
{
S′ : S′ = (gij , S−ij), i 6= j
}⋃{
S′ : S′ = (ai, S−i)
}
Next, define a state S as a long-run equilibrium of the network formation model if for any
sequence of vanishing preference shocks, the stationary distribution pi places a positive prob-
ability on S (Kandori et al., 1993).
Theorem 3 Suppose assumptions 1-5 hold:
1. A state S ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium in a pair-wise stable network iff if it receives the
highest probability in its neighborhood N.
2. The most likely network states Smode ∈ S (the one where the network spends most of
its time) are pairwise Nash networks.
3. The long-run equilibria of the underlying evolutionary model that are given by Smode,
which need not be Pareto efficient.
3.3.2 Meeting process of random dimension
Now consider what appears to be a very unrestrictive meeting process, where every period
a random individual meets a set of potential friends of random size and composition. Let
κ be a discrete process with support 2, . . . , n and augment the meeting process with an
additional initialization step with respect to the dimension of µ. In particular, at each period
first κ is realized and then µk is drawn just as before. It is relatively straightforward to
establish, without any assumptions on the process κ, that this augmented process has the
same stationary distribution pi as the one from theorem 1.40 This is another demonstration
of the fact that different meeting processes result in observationally equivalent models.
4 Data and estimation
The model is implemented with data on smoking and friendships from the National Longitu-
dinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health). I employ a Bayesian estimation technique
based on MCMC approximations of the likelihood41. The particular MCMC algorithm I
propose is a modification of Murray et al. (2006) and Mele (2017) drawing on theorems 1 and
2, which have broader implications for constructing algorithms for estimation and simulation
from the model.
40I omit here the formal statement and the proof as it essentially follows the one from 1.
41Direct estimation via maximizing the likelihood is not feasible because the likelihood can be evaluated
only up to an intractable constant.
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4.1 The Add Health data
The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health is a longitudinal study of a nationally
representative sample of adolescents in grades 7–12 in the United States in the 1994–95 school
year. In total, 80 high schools were selected together with their “feeder“ schools. The sample
is representative of US schools with respect to region of country, urbanicity, school size,
school type, and ethnicity. The students were first surveyed in-school and then at home in
four follow-up waves conducted in 1994–95, 1996, 2001–02, and 2007–08. This paper makes
use of Wave I of the in-home interviews, which contain rich data on individual behaviors,
home environment, and friendship networks.42
To provide unbiased and complete coverage of the social network, all enrolled students in
the schools from the so-called saturated sample were eligible for in-home interviews. These
were 16 schools of which 2 large schools (with a total combined enrollment exceeding 3,300)
and 14 small schools (with enrollments of fewer than 300). One of the large schools is
predominantly white and is located in a mid-sized town. The other is ethnically heterogeneous
and is located in a major metropolitan area. The 14 small schools, some public and some
private, are located in both rural and urban areas.
In addition, Add Health data have been merged with existing databases with information
about respondents’ neighborhoods and communities. For example, the American Chamber
of Commerce Research Association (ACCRA) compiles cost of living index, which is linked
to the Add Health data on the basis of state and county FIPS codes for the year in which
the data were collected. From the ACCRA, I use administrative data on the average price
of a carton of cigarettes.43 Additional details about the estimation sample including sample
construction and sample statistics are presented in the appendix.
4.2 Bayesian estimation
The model delivers network state dynamic which is a Markov chain with unique stationary
distribution pi. Because no information is available on when the network process started or
on its initial state, the best prediction about the network state is given by pi. Thus, for
estimation purposes, the stationary distribution can be thought of as the likelihood. Given
42In addition to the in-home interview from Wave I, data on friendship are available from the in-school and
Wave III interviews. However, the in-school questionnaire itself does not provide information on important
dimensions of an individual’s socio-economic and home environment, such as student allowances, parental
education, and parental smoking behaviors. On the other hand, during the collection of the Wave III data,
the respondents were not in high school any more. For more details on Add Health research design, see
www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/design.
43For details see the Council for Community and Economic Research www.c2er.org, formerly the American
Chamber of Commerce Research Association.
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a single network observation S ∈ S, the likelihood is given by:
p(S|θ) = exp{Pθ(S)}
Hθ
(8)
where Pθ is the potential (evaluated at θ) and Hθ =
∑
S∈S exp{S} is an (intractable) nor-
malizing constant.44
The specific form of the likelihood pertains to the exponential family, whose application
to graphical models has been termed as Exponential Random Graph Models.45 Various gen-
erative and descriptive approaches have been proposed, both within frequentist and Bayesian
paradigms, to address this specific tractability problem. I adopt a Bayesian estimation and
propose an algorithm for sampling from the posterior which is a modification of the double
M-H algorithm of Murray et al., 2006 and Mele (2017), informed by theorem 2.
The posterior sampling algorithm is exhibited in table 1. In the original double M-
H algorithm, an M-H sampling of S from piθ(S) is nested in an M-H sampling of θ from
the posterior p(θ|S). The novelty of my approach is the random dimension of the meeting
process in step 5. Theorem 2 suggests that varying k improves the convergence and theorem
1 demonstrates that changing k leaves the stationary distribution unaltered. The validity of
the particular implementation is proven in proposition 4.
Proposition 4 [Varying double M-H algorithm] Let 1 < k ≤ n and suppose assump-
tions 2 and 3 hold. If in the algorithm of table 1, the proposal density conditional on meeting
(i, Ik) of random dimension k, qµ(S
′|S); (i, Ik)) is symmetric, then the unconditional proposal
Q(S′|S) is symmetric. In particular, the acceptance ratio of the inner M-H step 9 does not
depend on pk and qµ.
Finally, the Bayesian estimator requires specifying prior distributions and proposal den-
sities. The prior p(θ) is normal centered around the OLS coefficients of the respective linear
regressions. The variances are chosen wide enough so that 0 is at least a standard deviation
away from the posterior mean. Proposals pk, µ, and qµ are uniform over their respective
domains.
4.3 Parametrization
The payoffs from (1) and (2) have five sets of parameters: vi, wij , q, h and φ. In the
empirical specification, the first three are functions of the data vi = V (Xi), wij = W (Xi, Xj),
qijk = q(Xi, Xj , Xk). I explore a wide set of parametrizations which are informed by the
44The size of S and the summation in calculating Hθ are so large, even for small networks, that the value
of p(S|θ) cannot be calculated directly for practical purposes. For n = 10 the summation includes 255 terms.
45For more see Frank and Strauss (1986); Wasserman and Pattison (1996).
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Table 1: Varying double M-H algorithm
Input: initial θ(0), number of iterations T , size of the Monte Carlo R, data S
1. for t = 1 . . . T
2. Propose θ′ ∼ q(θ′; θ(t−1), S)
3. Initialize S(0) = S
4. for r = 1 . . . R
5. Draw k ∼ pk(k)
6. Draw a meeting µ(i, Ik) where i ∈ {1 . . . N} and Ik ⊂ {1 . . . N}\{i} from qµ(i, Ik)
8. Propose S′ where (ai, {gij}j∈Ik) are drawn from qµ(S′|S(r−1); (i, Ik))
9. Compute a¯ =
exp{Pθ′ (S′)}
exp{Pθ′ (S(r−1))}
Q(S(r−1)|S′;pk,qi,Ik )
Q(S′|S(r−1);pk,qi,Ik )
10. Draw a ∼ Uniform[0, 1]
11. If a < a¯ then S(r) = S′ else S(r) = S(r−1)
12. end for [r]
13. Compute a¯ = q(θ
′;θ(t−1))
q(θ(t−1);θ′)
p(θ′)
p(θ(t−1))
exp{P
θ(t−1) (S
(R))}
exp{P
θ(t−1) (S)}
exp{Pθ′ (S)}
exp{Pθ′ (S(R))}
14. Draw a ∼ Uniform[0, 1]
15. If a < a¯ then θ(t) = θ′ else θ(t) = θ(t−1)
16. end for [t]
salient features of the data and by the particular experiments I am interested in.46 Careful
scrutiny of the data motivates the final specification which is discussed in the appendix
(appendix B.3 on page 33).
4.4 Identification
The identification, within the framework of many networks, follows from the connection of
the model with the family of exponential random graph models (ERGM). These are a broad
class of statistical models, capable of incorporating arbitrary dependencies among the links
of a network. As a result, ERGM have been very popular in estimating statistical models of
network formation. A corollary of theorem 1 is that the likelihood of the model falls in the
family of ERGM.
Corollary 1 The likelihood l(θ|S) ∝ exp
{∑R
r=1 θiwi(S,X)
}
, where wi : S×X −→ R.
As the number of networks grows to infinity, identification follows from the theory of the
exponential family. In particular, it is enough that the sufficient statistics wi are linearly
independent functions on S×X. In the structural parametrization of the model above, this
condition is established immediately.47
46Importantly, the trade off between flexibility and data limitation is tight. Recall that our identification
framework is casted in the many networks asymptotics and, in the end, we have 16 networks.
47Most of the parameters are identified in the asymptotic frame, where the size of the network grows to
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Unobservable heterogeneity in friendship selection and decision to smoke
In addition to the models’ parameters for observable attributes, it is possible to incorporate
agents’ specific unobservable types τi ∼ N(0, σ2τ ) which may influence both the utility for
friendships, e.g. W (., .) could include term |τi − τj |, and also the propensity to smoke, e.g.
V (.) could include a term ρττi. In this case the likelihood has to integrate out ~τ :
p(S|θ) =
∫
~τ
exp{Pθ(S, ~τ}∑
Sˆ exp{Pθ(Sˆ, ~τ)}
φ(~τ)d~τ (9)
There are a couple of approaches to discuss identification in this case. Within the Bayesian
paradigm, identification casually obtains as long as the data provides information about the
parameters. The understand the issues note even a weakly informative prior can introduce
curvature into the posterior density surface that facilitates numerical maximization and the
use of MCMC methods. However, the prior distribution is not updated in directions of the
parameter space in which the likelihood function is flat (see An and Schorfheide (2007)). From
a frequentist perspective, the heuristic identification argument goes as follows. Individuals
who are far away in observables, must have realizations of the unobservables very close by.
If in the data those individuals are either smokers or non smokers with very high probability
then it must be the case that ρτ is large. However, formalizing this argument is nether
immediate nor it is clear whether this argument will support non-parametric identification
so this endeavor is left for future research.
Adding unobservable heterogeneity imposes substantial computational costs to the esti-
mation and simulation algorithms because these need to include an additional step—drawing
from ~τ . For the Add Health data, such an extension is out of reach because of the limited
number of well-sampled networks.
4.5 Estimation results
Table 2 presents the posterior means of model’s parameters which have been transformed
for ease of interpretation to baseline probabilities, marginal probabilities (MP in ppt) and
relative marginal probabilities (MP% in pct) 48. The estimates (in the last column) suggest
a substantial role for friends and home environment in adolescents’ decisions to smoke. In
particular, one additional friend who is a smoker increases the conditional probability of
smoking by 2.3 ppt.49 If 30% of the students in a school smoke, all other things being equal,
infinity (as opposed to the number of networks going to infinity). Further discussion of this point is outside
the scope of this work. For more see Xu (2011); Chandrasekhar and Jackson (2016).
48For example, the baseline probability of smoking θ1 is derived from the intercept v0 as
ev0
1+ev0
. Superscript
MP stands for marginal probability and MP% stands for marginal probability in percentages with respect to
the baseline probability of smoking e
v0
1+ev0
. Appendix B.3 on page 33 provides details.
49Because both friendships and smoking are choices in the model, this parameter should be interpreted with
caution. In particular, the estimate cannot be interpreted as the effect on the likelihood of smoking from a
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Table 2: Parameter estimates (posterior means)
Utility of smoking
Parameter No Net Data Fixed Net No PE No Tri Model
1 Baseline probability of smoking 0.107∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
2 Price −0.0015 −0.0016 −0.0065∗ −0.0023 −0.0017
3 HH smokesMP 0.094∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
4 Mom edu (HS&CO)MP −0.037∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
5 BlacksMP −0.159∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗∗ −0.232∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗∗
6 Grade 9+MP 0.134∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
7 30% of the school smokesMP 0.082∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ — 0.075∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
Utility of friendships
Parameter No SNet Data Fixed Net No PE No Tri Model
8 Baseline number of friends — — 2.497∗∗∗ 1.888∗∗∗ 1.936∗∗∗
9 Different sexMP% — — −0.704∗∗∗ −0.709∗∗∗ −0.711∗∗∗
10 Different gradesMP% — — −0.871∗∗∗ −1.112∗∗∗ −0.871∗∗∗
11 Different raceMP% — — −0.413∗∗∗ −0.412∗∗∗ −0.459∗∗∗
12 TrianglesMP% — — 0.031∗∗∗ — 0.045∗∗∗
13 φMP — 0.025∗∗∗ — 0.024∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
Note: MP stands for the estimated marginal probability in percentage points and MP% for estimated
marginal probability in percent, relative to the baseline probability. The posterior sample contains
105 simulations before discarding the first 20%. Posterior mean outside of the shortest 90/95/99%
credible sets is indicated by ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ respectively.
then an individual is 7.7 ppt more likely to smoke (row 7). Also the presence of a smoker
in the household increases the likelihood of smoking by 11 ppt. Note that these marginal
effects are first order approximations which do not take into account equilibrium adjustments
of individuals’ friendships.50
In addition to the model’s posteriors (in the last column), table 2 presents the posterior
means for different scenarios: (a.) without network data, (b.) with fixed network, (c.)
without peer effects, (d.) without externalities of common friends (triangles). While the
estimates have particularly limited interpretation it is worth pointing out that the estimate
for the price coefficient does not vary much and as figure 1 suggests the largest biases are
those when peer effects terms or when the externalities from common friends are omitted.
In contrast, when the network is held fixed or there is no network data available the bias
is relatively small.51 In addition, when comparing the estimates for other determinants
of adolescent smoking (presence of a smoker in the household or maternal education) the
randomly assigned friend who is a smoker as individuals cannot be forced into friendships.
50This is addressed in the following section.
51The hypotheses of equal means between the model’s posterior and each of the other posteriors in figure 1
are rejected with p < 0.01 by t-tests.
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Figure 1: Posterior distribution for the price parameter
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Note: The hypotheses for equal means between the model’s posterior and each of the other posteriors
on the plot are rejected with p < 0.01 by t-tests.
estimation biases when the network externalities are mis-specified and when peer effects are
omitted are of the same sign. This observation is robust to alternative specification where
instead of price on smoking, the income (allowances) are included.52
4.6 Model fit
Table 3 compares selected statistics from the data to those from a sample simulated with
the estimated model.53 In addition to statistics that are directly targeted by the model’s
parameters (overall prevalence, density, and reciprocity), statistics which are only indirectly
governed by model parameters are reported in tables 3 and 4, e.g. maximum degree, certain
friendship configurations, mixing etc. Overall the model fits well the smoking decisions and
the network features of the data. The only caveat is the number of triangles as fraction of
the size of the network which in the data is 0.119 while in the simulations from the model is
0.060. The most likely reason for this discrepancy is that in the model triangles are generated
52See table 10 in the appendix.
53Using the parameter estimates, a Markov chain of size 105 from the k-player dynamic is simulated from
which, to reduce the auto dependence, every 1, 000 element is sampled.
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Table 3: Model fit
Selected (non-targeted) moments
Moment Model Data
Prevalence 0.336 0.331
Density 0.0074 0.0070
Avg degree 1.02 0.91
Max degree 4.34 4.87
aigijaj/n 0.112 0.098
(1− ai)gij(1− aj)/n 0.245 0.226
Triangles/n 0.060 0.119
Mixing patterns
Moment Model Data
Homophily Index 0.612 0.630
Coleman Homophily Index 1.001 1.001
Freeman Segregation Index 0.352 0.368
Table 4: Fit mixing matrix (model left, data right)
Nominee Nominee
N
o
m
in
a
to
r Smoker Nonsmoker Smoker Nonsmoker
Smoker 76% (57.1) 24% (18.1) 77% (52.8) 23% (15.5)
Nonsmoker 41% (18.1) 59% (26.3) 41% (15.5) 59% (22.8)
only via a single parameter which does not depend on observables, i.e. race, sex etc. This
parsimonious specification is dictated by the small sample size of only 16 networks and further
exploration of this feature of the data is left for the future.
5 Policy experiments
5.1 A. Changes in the price of tobacco
The estimated model serves as a numerical prototype for the equilibrium response to policy
interventions and, more generally, for the analysis of the determinants of teen smoking.54
Table 5 presents the effects of increases in tobacco prices ranging from 20 to 220 cents
(in the sample tobacco prices average at $1.67 for a pack). The second through the fifth
columns report predictions for the change in overall smoking prevalence in percentage points
for various scenarios: the full model, the model when agents are restricted from adjusting
their friendship links, the model when agents are not subject to peer effects (φ and h are set
to zero) and, finally, the predictions from a model which has been estimated without peer
effects altogether.55
54Each policy is simulated as 105 draws from the stationary distribution of the model.
55Note that the scenario “PE off” entails stronger restrictions on individuals’ social environments than just
keeping friendships fixed. In particular, when simulating individuals’ smoking decisions, I keep constant their
22
Table 5: Changes in the price of tobacco
Price increase Model Fixed net PE off Model w/o PE
20 5.05 2.73 0.52 2.38
40 7.72 5.18 1.04 4.82
60 9.98 6.74 1.34 7.05
80 11.53 8.37 1.90 9.24
100 13.31 9.56 2.37 11.39
120 14.42 10.93 2.88 13.29
140 15.44 12.14 3.36 14.98
160 16.40 13.11 3.82 16.81
180 17.59 14.03 4.15 18.41
200 18.31 14.97 4.57 19.84
220 19.08 15.85 5.04 21.18
Note: The first column shows proposed increases in tobacco prices in cents. The average price of a
pack of cigarettes is $1.67 so that 20 cents is approximately 10%. The second through fourth columns
show the predicted increase in the overall smoking (baseline 33%) in ppt from the full model, from
the model when the friendship network is fixed, and from the model when the coefficients φ and h are
set to zero respectively. The last column shows the predicted effect produced from a model which is
estimated with no peer effects.
Table 5 suggests that the social interactions, including the response of the social network,
is quantitatively relevant in measuring the intended effect of increasing tobacco prices. The
baseline smoking in the sample is 33% so that a price increase of $1.00 (about 60%) reduces
the smoking to 23%. Comparison between model’s predictions with and without friendship
adjustments (columns two and three) reveals that the freedom of breaking friendships and
changing smoking behavior induces larger decrease in overall smoking compared to situation
when individuals are held in their existing (fixed) social networks. Figuratively, a price
change has two effects on the decision to smoke: the direct effect operates through changing
individuals’ exogenous decision environment and the indirect/spillover effect operates through
changing the peer norm which then puts additional pressure on the individuals’ to follow the
change. When comparing the endogenous to fixed network, the direct effect is likely to be
stronger in the former environment while the indirect effect is likely to be stronger in the
latter environment.56
Comparison of the model’s predictions with and without peer effects (columns two and
four) suggest that social interactions account for roughly 70% of the decrease in smoking
following a price increase. Finally, note that the prediction from a model relying on coarse
calculations, if one is to completely discard the presence of peer effects, and the predictions
friendship choices, their friends’ smoking statuses, and the average smoking behavior of the population overall
(i.e., the number of smokers in the population).
56Additional analysis and simulations are provided in the appendix on page 35.
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from the model when the social network is held fixed are grossly inline.
5.2 B. Changes in the racial composition of schools
Suppose that in a given neighborhood there are two racially segregated schools: “White
School” consisting of only white students and “Black School” consisting of only black students.
One would expect that the smoking prevalence in White school is much higher compared to
Black school because, in the sample, black high students smoke thee times less than white high
school students. Consider a policy aiming to promote racial desegregation, which prevents
schools from enrolling more than x percent of students of the same race. If such policy
is in place, will students from different races form friendships and will these friendships
systematically impact the overall smoking in one or another direction?
To simulate the effect of the proposed policy I consider one of the racially balanced schools
in my sample.57 The Whites and the Blacks from this school serve as prototypes for the White
School and Black School respectively.58 To implement the proposed policy I randomly select
a set of students from the White School and a set of students from the Black School and
swap them. For example to simulate the effect of a 70% cap on the same-race students in a
school, I need to simulate a swap of 30%.
Table 6 presents the simulation results, which suggest that racial composition affects the
overall smoking prevalence. The first column shows the size of the set of students which is
being swapped. The second, third, and forth columns show the simulated smoking prevalence
in the White School, Black School, and both, respectively. The table suggest that overall
smoking prevalence is lower when schools are racially balanced, thus supporting policies
promoting racial integration in the context of fighting high smoking rates. Finally, the tests
in the rightmost four columns lendstatistical support of this finding.59
It is important to note that the simulations here offer only suggestive evidence on the
role of racial desegregation on the overall prevalence of smoking. There are many factors,
e.g. the profile of all observables for the entire schools (income, home environment, tobacco
57The school has 150 students of which 40% are Whites and 42% are Blacks. It incorporates students from
grades 7 to 12.
58As an alternative to splitting one school into two racially segregated schools, one could consider two schools
from the data that are already racially segregated. However, the only school with a high ratio of Blacks in the
sample incorporates students from grades 7 and 8. If this school serves as a prototype for the Black School,
then I am faced with two options for the choice of the White School. If the White School incorporates only 7th
and 8th graders, then smoking prevalence will be low regardless, since these grades are mostly nonsmoking.
Alternatively, if the White School incorporates higher grades, the simulation results will be driven in part by
the asymmetry in the population (7th and 8th graders do not make friends with students from higher grades).
Consequently, the school that incorporates black students in grades 7 and 8 only cannot properly serve as a
prototype for the Black School.
59The appendix examines the changes in the distribution of the overall smoking rates. In particular, figure
4 illustrates the shift in the distribution for three of the segregation scenarios (0%, 30% and 50% swaps)
suggesting that de-segregation decreases the likelihood of outcomes consistent with higher smoking prevalence
(the mass above 0.17).
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Table 6: Predicted Smoking Prevalence following Same-race Students Cap
Same-race School School Overall p-val H0
cap (%) White Black (Y ) E[Yi] = E[Y0] E[Yi] = E[Yi−1] Yi = Y0 Yi = Yi−1
0 27.2 6.7 17.0 - - - -
10 24.4 8.1 16.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 21.5 9.8 15.6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
30 20.3 11.0 15.6 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.64
40 16.5 14.2 15.3 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
50 15.6 15.1 15.3 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.49
Note: A cap of x% same-race students is implemented with a swap of (100− x)% students. Columns
2, 3 and 4 show smoking prevalence. Columns 5 and 6 show the p value for the hypothesis of mean
equality in overall smoking. Columns 7 and 8 show the p value for the hypothesis of equality in
distribution of overall smoking (two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). Both test cannot reject the
hypotheses for equal mean/equal distribution of the overall smoking for two cases: (a.) same-race
cap 30% and same-race cap 20% and (b.) same-race cap 50% and same-race cap 40%, suggesting
non-linear relation between school composition and overall smoking.
price, . . . ), that are likely to influence the outcome of desegregation. Unfortunately, the Add
Health data does not offer sufficient variation in those factors.60 The simulations in this
section are done using a particular (racially balanced) school from the data as a prototype.
The author hopes this paper to stimulate further research into this question.
5.3 C. Cascade effects of an anti-smoking campaign
The smoking prevalence in the school with the highest smoking rate is 44.7%. For this school,
I consider the effects of an anti-smoking campaign that can prevent with certainty a given
number of students from smoking, e.g. a group of students are invited to a weekend-long
information camp on the health consequences of smoking. The camp is very effective in
terms of preventing students from smoking; however, it is too costly to engage all students.
The question is once the “treated students” come back will their smoking friends follow their
example and stop smoking, or will their friends un-friend them and continue smoking?
Table 7 presents the simulation results, which suggest that an anti-smoking campaign may
have a large impact on the overall prevalence of smoking, without necessarily being able to
directly engage a large part of the student population.61 In particular, the multiplier factor–
the ratio between the actual effect and effect constrained to the treated sub-population–
indicated a substantial spillover effects, operating through the social network, from those
who attended the camp to the rest of the school.
60There is only 1 racially balanced school in the data sample!
61The policy is simulated 103 times, where each time a new random draw of attendees is being considered.
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Table 7: Spillovers
Campaign (%) Smoking
Predicted effect Actual
Multiplier
proportional effect
- 45.3 - - -
1.0 43.1 0.5 2.2 5.0
2.5 41.7 1.1 3.7 3.2
5.0 39.2 2.3 6.1 2.7
10.0 35.1 4.5 10.2 2.2
20.0 27.2 9.1 18.1 2.0
30.0 21.8 13.6 23.5 1.7
50.0 13.3 22.7 32.0 1.4
Note: The first column lists the alternative attendance rates. The second and third columns display
the smoking rate and the change in smoking rate respectively if the decrease would be proportional
to the intervention, i.e. computes a baseline without peer effects. The last column computes the ratio
between the percentage change in the number of smokers and the attendance rate. Note that that
attendance is random with respect to the smoking status of the students. If the campaign is able to
target only students who are currently smokers, the spillover effects will be even larger.
6 Concluding remarks
The premise of this paper is that social norms and behaviors are shaped jointly and that
individuals confine their choices of friendships to those for which there is a mutual consent
(Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). The paper proposes a novel formulation of a decision environ-
ment where the requirement for mutual consent is captured by the stability constraints. This
environment gives rise to a family of equilibria indexed by the complexity of the contemplated
deviations, e.g. changing behaviors and a single friendship, and two friendships, etc. The
presence of complementaries may result in multiple equilibria, ranked in probabilistic sense as
these equilibria arise in consensual dynamic—adaptive dynamic in which relationships arise
from mutual consent.
Application of the proposed framework to adolescents’ friendship selection and decisions
to smoke illustrates the opportunities for public policy arising from accounting for the in-
stability of the social network in response to increases in tobacco prices or to changing the
racial composition of schools. This study also sheds light on the estimation biases due to
lack of social network data and on the non-linear relationship between the social norms and
individuals’ behaviors theorized by Graham et al. (2014) and experimentally discovered in
Carrell et al. (2013). Overall this study formulates an avenue to study the complementari-
ties and coordination in social networks with accents on the presence of consent in forming
relationships and on the possibility for multiple equilibrium outcomes.
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A Proofs
Proof (Proposition 1(on p. 10)) The preferences of each player are summarized by the
potential function P : S×Xn −→ R (which does not depend on i):
P(S,X) =
∑
i
aiv(Xi) +
1
2
∑
i,j;i 6=j
gijw (Xi, Xj) (10)
+
1
2
h
∑
i,j;i 6=j
aiaj +
1
2
φ
∑
i,j;i 6=j
aiajgij (11)
+
1
6
∑
i,j,k
q(Xi, Xj , Xk)gijgjkgki (12)
Derive the incremental changes of individuals’ utilities and the potential function:
∆aiui() = v(Xi) + h
∑
j 6=i
aj + φ
∑
j 6=i
gijaj (13)
∆aiP() = v(Xi) + h
∑
j 6=i
aj + φ
∑
j 6=i
gijaj (14)
∆gijui() = w(Xi, Xj) + φaiaj +
∑
k
q(Xi, Xj , Xk)gikgjk (15)
∆gijP() = w(Xi, Xj) + φaiaj +
∑
k
q(Xi, Xj , Xk)gikgjk (16)
Thus ∆aiui() = ∆aiP() and ∆gijui() = ∆gijP(). Further the symmetry of preferences
(necessary for the existence of potential) is sufficient to show that (i.) the stability constraints
are never biding so that the unconstrained optimum is feasible (ii.) for any i and Ik the
solution of individual’s decision problem (3)–(4) is given by
argmax
ai,gij
j∈Ik\i
P(S) (17)
Note that the argmax in (17) is always non empty since P is discrete function on finite set
which implies part 1. Part two follows from a similar argument noting that
Proposition 5 S∗ ∈ NEkSN iff
(a∗i , g
∗
ij)j∈Ik\i ∈ argmaxai,gij
j∈Ik\i
P((ai, gij)j∈Ik\i;S∗−(ai,gij)j∈Ik\i) (18)
To see why this is the case consider S∗ ∈ NEkSN. For any Ik, by definition, (a∗i , g∗ij)j∈Ik\i is
a solution of (3)–(4). Then (a∗i , g
∗
ij)j∈Ik\i solves (17). This shows one direction of proposition
5. The converse follows mutatis mutandis.
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Proof (Proposition 2(on p. 10)) For k = 2 definition 1 directly implies that the NEkSN
is pairwise stable and this is a general observation, independent of the particular payoff
structure here. For k = n, observe that the NEkSNs are the states that maximize the potential
function. Consider then the following strategies in a normal form link-announcement game
(conditional on the equilibrium behavior ~a): each player announces his NEkSN links. Given
that others will announce exactly the links of a NEkSN, it is easy to see that no player has
a profitable deviation. Finally, part 3 follows from proposition 5.
Proof (Proposition 3 (on p. 12) That any Nash equilibrium in a k-player stable net-
work absorbing follows from the definition of NEkSN. The second part follows from observing
that Pt is a submartingale:
E[Pt+1|St] ≥ Pt. (19)
So that {Pt} converges almost surely. Since the network is of finite size it follows that {Pt}
is constant for large t. Because of assumption 2 this can happen only if St ∈ NEkSN.
Proof (Theorem 1 (p. 12)) Note that the k-PCD induces a finite state Markov chain
which is irreducible, positive recurrent, and aperiodic. The first part of the theorem follows
from standard results on convergence of Markov chains. For the second part, we need to
integrate out the meeting process to obtain the one step transition probabilities Pr(S′|S) for
S, S′ ∈ Sn, and then show that Pr(S′|S) exp{P(S)} = Pr(S|S′) exp{P(S′)}.
Let ∆(Sn) be the set of all probability distributions on Sn. Because Sn has no natural
ordering, one can think of p ∈ ∆(Sn) as a function p : Sn → R such that p(S) ≥ 0 and∑
p(S) = 1.
Consider the case when Pr(S′|S) > 0.62 For fixed S, S′ ∈ Sn let MS′|S be the set of all
possible meeting outcomes which can result in state transitioning from S to S′. For example,
if S and S′ differ in the status of aii then MS′|S = {(aii, Ik−1)|Ik−1 = {i1, i2 . . . ık−1}, ij 6= i}.
Recall that Nk(S, µ) ⊂ Sn denotes the set of all possible outcomes of the meeting µ following
a state S. The proof follows from the following observations:63
Lemma 1 Let S, S′ ∈ Sn and µ = (i, Ik−1). Then
(i) MS′|S = MS|S′ for all S, S′ ∈ Sn.
(ii) S′ ∈ Nk(µ, S) iff S ∈ Nk(µ, S′).
(iii) If S′ ∈ Nk(µ, S) then Nk(µ, S) = Nk(µ, S′).
Part (i) asserts that each meeting which can result in the state moving from S to S′ may
result in, provided the starting state were S′, the state moving from S′ to S. Part (ii) states
62Out assumptions guarantee that Pr(S′, S) > 0 iff Pr(S, S′) > 0. Thus, if Pr(S′|S) = 0 then Pr(S|S′) = 0
and, trivially, Pr(S′|S) exp{P(S)} = Pr(S|S′) exp{P(S′)} holds.
63The formal proof involves basic reasoning revolving around the intuition behind these observations. Below
I provide the interpretation while omitting the proof which is available upon request. The challenging part is
to state and interpret the lemma.
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that if there is a meeting which can result in S transiting to S′, then there is a meeting which
can result in S′ transiting to S (note that by (i) we know this is the same meeting). Finally,
part (iii) notes that if a meeting µ could result in S transiting to S′, not only µ can result in
S′ transiting to S (by (i)), but also the set of all feasible states following µ and S coincides
with the set of all feasible states following µ and S′. From lemma 1, the one step transition
probability can be written as:
P(S) Pr(S′|S) = P(S)
∑
µ∈MS′|S
Pr(µ)
exp{ui(S′)}∑
Sˆ∈Nk(µ,S) exp{ui(Sˆ)}
(20)
= P(S)
∑
µ∈MS|S′
Pr(µ)
exp{P(S′)}∑
Sˆ∈Nk(µ,S) exp{P(Sˆ)}
(21)
= P(S′)
∑
µ∈MS|S′
Pr(µ)
exp{P(S)}∑
Sˆ∈Nk(µ,S′) exp{P(Sˆ)}
(22)
= P(S) Pr(S, S′) (23)
Where the particular expression for Pr(S′|S, µ) = exp{ui(S′)}∑
Sˆ∈Nk(µ,S) exp{ui(Sˆ)}
follows from assump-
tion 4 on the distribution of the error term. Formally this completes the proof.
For an illustration, I write down the transition probability for the special case when S and
S′ agree on all {gij}i 6=j but differ in ai for some i, say S = (ai = 0, S−i) and S′ = (a′i = 1, S−i)
(here S−i = {gij}i 6=j). Then we have
Pr(S′|S) =
∑
µ∈M|ii
Pr(µ)
exp{ui(S′)}∑
Sˆ∈Nk(µ,S) exp{ui(Sˆ)}
(24)
where M|ii is the set of all possible meeting tuples (i, Ik−1) where player i meets different
{i1, . . . , ik−1}. Note that |M|ii| =
(
n−1
k−1
)
. If all meeting are equally likely and individuals are
indifferent to all outcomes (i.e. ui is a constant), the above reduces to:
Pr(S′|S, k) =
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
1
n
(
n−1
k−1
) 1
2k
=
1
n2k
(25)
Proof (Theorem 2 (p. 13)) Because there is no natural ordering of Sn, use functions as
opposed to vectors in the eigenproblem. For I ⊂ {(i, j) : i ≥ j}, define eI : Sn → R as
eI(S) =
∏
i 6=j∈I
(−1)gij
∏
i=j∈I
(−1)aij (26)
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with e∅(S) = 1 for all S. Next, define
λk,I =
∑
i∈{i:(i,i)/∈I}
(n−1−|Ii|
k−1
)
n
(
n−1
k−1
) (27)
where Ii = {j : (i, j) ∈ I, i 6= j}
Lemma 2 There are 2n(n+1)/2 pairs of (λk,I , ek,I) such that
(i)
∑
S ek,I(S)ek,I′(S) = 0 if I 6= I ′ and
∑
S ek,I(S)ek,I(S) = 2
n(n+1)/2
(ii) For any S ∈ Sn ∑
S′
Pr(S′|S; k)eI(S′) = λk,IeI(S). (28)
The first part of the lemma is trivial to verify. For the second part, we can write:∑
Pr(S′|S)eI(S′) =
∑
S′
∑
µ
Pr(µ) Pr(S′|S, µ)eI(S′) (29)
=
∑
S′
∑
µ∈{µ∩I=∅}
Pr(µ) Pr(S′|S, µ)eI(S′) + (30)
+
∑
S′
∑
µ∈{µ∩I 6=∅}
Pr(µ) Pr(S′|S, µ)eI(S′) (31)
=
∑
S′
∑
µ∈{µ∩I=∅}
Pr(µ) Pr(S′|S, µ)eI(S′) (32)
Terms (31) vanish because whenever µ ∩ I 6= ∅ then ∑S′∈Nk(S,µ) Pr(S′|S, µ)eI(S′) = 0, as
this summation involves 2k terms and for half of these terms eI(S
′) = eI(S) while for the
other half eI(S
′) = −eI(S), implying that
∑
µ∈{µ∩I 6=∅}
∑
S′∈Nk(S,µ) Pr(S
′|S, µ)eI(S′) = 0.
Finally, note that if µ ∈ {µ ∩ I = ∅}, i.e. µ = {(i, i), (i, i1), . . . (i, ik−1)} ∩ I = ∅ then for
any S′ ∈ Nk(S, µ) we have that eI(S) = eI(S′) so that for (32) we can write∑
Pr(S′|S)eI(S′) = eI(S) Pr(µ)
∑
S′
∑
µ∈{µ∩I=∅}
Pr(S′|S, µ) (33)
= eI(S)
1
n
(
n−1
k−1
) ∑
µ∈{µ∩I=∅}
∑
S′
Pr(S′|S, µ) (34)
= eI(S)
1
n
(
n−1
k−1
) ∑
i∈{i:(i,i)/∈I}
(
n− 1− |Ii|
k − 1
)
(35)
because, by assumption, Pr(µ) = 1
n(n−1k−1)
and
∑
S′ Pr(S
′|S, µ) = 1. With this the proof of the
lemma is complete. To complete the proof of the theorem note that λk,I are decreasing in
|I|, so that the (second) largest λk,I is achieved when I = {(i, j)} with i 6= j.
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Proof (Theorem 3 (p. 14) The proof follows immediately from the expression for the
stationary distribution obtained in theorem 1 and proposition 5.
Proof (Proposition 4 (p. 17) For fixed S, S′ ∈ Sn let KS′|S ⊂ {2, 3, . . . , n} be the set
of all possible meeting sizes consistent with transition from S to S′ of the k-PD. Recall
that, for fixed k, MS′|S is the set of all possible meeting outcomes which can result in state
transitioning from S to S′. The argument bellow follows from lemma 1, together with the
observation that KS′|S = KS|S′ . Indeed, the unconditional proposal Q from the algorithm in
table 1 can be written as:
Q(S′|S) =
∑
k∈KS′|S
pk(k)
∑
µ∈MS′|S
Pr(µ)
1
|Nk(µ, S)| (36)
=
∑
k∈KS|S′
pk(k)
∑
µ∈MS|S′
Pr(µ)
1
|Nk(µ, S)| (37)
=
∑
k∈KS|S′
pk(k)
∑
µ∈MS|S′
Pr(µ)
1
|Nk(µ, S′) (38)
= Q(S|S′)
B Implementation details
B.1 Add Health Data
This research uses data from Add Health, a program project directed by Kathleen Mullan
Harris and designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the
Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with
cooperative funding from 23 other federal agencies and foundations. Special acknowledg-
ment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in the original design.
Information on how to obtain the Add Health data files is available on the Add Health
website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth). No direct support was received from grant
P01-HD31921 for this analysis.
B.2 Sample selection and sample statistics
This research uses data from Wave I of Add Health. The in-home questionnaire contains
44 sections collecting a wide array of information about adolescents. In particular, the data
contain information about adolescents’ friendship networks. Each respondent is asked to
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for the Final Sample
Overall Min Max
Students 1867 42 234
Smoking 0.330 0.050 0.536
Male 0.504 0.346 0.581
Whites 0.867 0 0.989
Blacks 0.086 0 0.975
As-Hi-Ot 0.052 0 0.373
Price 167.8 137.3 220.1
Avg income 72.1 17.1 145.8
Mom edu 0.762 0.684 0.950
HH smokes 0.430 0.092 0.609
Avg friends 0.914 0.269 1.526
Num friends 0.914 0 6
Note: The final sample contains students from 16 high school networks.
nominate up to five of her best male and female friends. If individual A nominates individual
B as a friend, this does not imply that B nominates A. Because in the proposed model a
friendship nomination involves consent, a friendship presumes that both individuals have
nominated each other as friends.
In addition to the friendship network data, I use demographic data for the adolescents
(age, gender, grade, and race), for their home environments (presence of smoker in the house-
hold, pupil’s income and allowances, and mother’s education), and data for their smoking
behavior. The adolescent’s smoking status is deduced from the question, “During the past 30
days, on how many days did you smoke cigarettes?” and if the answer was one or more days,
the student’s smoking status is set to positive. Because all of the students in the saturated
sample were eligible for in-home interview, I have detailed information about student friends
as well.
As pointed earlier the schools from the saturated sample (16 schools out of 80) were
illegible for exhaustive survey. Since the size of the schools from this sample ranges from 20
to more than 1500, the smallest and the largest schools are dropped. Also, a special needs
school is dropped for having atypical smoking and friendship patterns. After this still the
largest school in the sample enrolls more than 4 times more students compared to the second
largest. To maintain sample observations of comparable size (each school is an observation),
this school is split into grades 9, 10, 11, and 12 and, for this school, each grade is treated as
a separate network.64 Table 8 shows selected descriptive statistics for the estimation sample.
64Less than 20% of the friendships are inter-grade so that this split does not affect substantially the friendship
network.
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B.3 Parametrization and re-parametrizations
For the empirical specifications selected parameters in (1) and (2) are functions of the data.
In particular, the utility of smoking is
v(Xi) = v0 + vpricepi (39)
+vhhsmokesχ(HHSi) + vmomeducχ(MOMEDUCi) (40)
+vblackχ(BLACKi) + vgrade9+χ(GRADE9Pi) (41)
and the utility of friendship is
w(Xi, Xj) = w0 + wsexχ(sexi 6= sexj) (42)
+wgradeχ(gradei 6= gradej) + wraceχ(racei 6= racej) (43)
Also, there is a term qijkgijgjkgki in which qijk = q(Xi, Xj , Xk) = qχ(gradei > 9)χ(gradej >
9)χ(gradek > 9). In addition to the above 11 parameters, (1) and (2) have the peer effect
parameters h and φ.
In table 2, the parameters have been transformed for ease of interpretation as follows.
Instead of v0, I report the baseline probability of smoking θ1 =
ev0
1+ev0 ∈ [0, 1]. Next, the
baseline number of friends is θ8 = (n−1) ew01+ew0 ∈ [0, n−1] where n is the size of the network.
Also some parameters have been re-parametrized as marginal probabilities in ppt (in table 2
indicated as MP ) or as relative marginal probabilities in pct (in table 2 indicated as MP%).
For example:65
ev0+vhhsmokes
1 + ev0+vhhsmokes
− e
v
0
1 + ev0
= θ3 (44)
ew0+wdiffsex
1 + ew0+wdiffsex
:
ew0
1 + ew0
= 1 + θ9 (45)
B.4 Markov chain parameters
Algorithm 1 is parametrized as following. The size of the posterior sample is T = 105 from
which the first 20% are discarded. The size of the interior loop, from steps 4− 12, is R = 103
for each network. The proposal for θ′ in step 2 is a random walk. The process k is a mixture
of two processes: with 75% k is small, i.e. k = 2 and with 25% it is drawn from discrete
uniform on {2, . . . , n−1}. Once k is fixed, the state S′ in step 8 is drawn from uniform in the
permissible neighborhood. In addition, with small probability (0.02) a large step is proposed
where S′ = 1− S.
65Note that the reparametrization is bijective so that it does not affect the estimation.
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C Background on tobacco smoking
Tobacco is the single greatest preventable cause of death in the world today.66 In the United
States alone, cigarette smoking causes approximately 443, 000 deaths each year (accounting
for one in every five deaths) and imposes an economic burden of more than $193 billion a year
in health care costs and loss of productivity. Approximately 1 million young people under 18
years of age start smoking each year; about 80% of adults who are smokers started smoking
before they were 18 (Kessler et al., 1996; Liang et al., 2001). Despite an overall decline in
smoking prevalence from 2005 to 2010, when the percentage of current smokers decreased
from 20.9% to 19.3%, the reduction in teen smoking has been less pronounced. In fact, the
proportions of 8th and 10th graders who smoke increased slightly in 2010. As with many
human behaviors, social interactions (peer influence) have often been pointed to as a major
driving force behind adolescent smoking choices.
D Robustness analysis
D.1 Additional counterfactual simulations
Table 9 supplements the last four columns of table 6 with additional tests. Figures 2 and
4 plot simulations of the posteriors from the counterfactual experiments price and school
composition respectively.
Table 9: Pairwise tests distribution overall smoking
Same-race
0 10 20 30 40 50
cap (%)
0 1.00 (1.00)
10 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (1.00)
20 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 1.00 (1.00)
30 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.87(0.64) 1.00 (1.00)
40 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.02(0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 1.00 (1.00)
50 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 0.75(0.49) 1.00 (1.00)
Note: Each cell shows p value for the hypothesis of mean equality in overall smoking between a pair of
scenarios (t-test for mean equality with t-stat for unequal variances). Each cell shows in parenthesis
the p value for the hypothesis of equality in distribution of overall smoking (two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test). For example both tests cannot reject the null when comparing equality in means (and
equality in distributions) of overall smoking between scenarios same-race cap 30% and same-race cap
20% (p-value 0.87(0.64)). Except for two cases the tests reject the null.
66The World Health Organization, Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic (2008). The statistics for the
U.S. are compiled from reports by the Surgeon General (2010), National Center for Health Statistics (2011),
and Monitoring the Future (2011).
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Figure 2: Distribution of the effect on overall smoking of selected price changes
Decrease in overall smoking (ppt)
-5 0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Endog net ∆ P=$0.40
Fixed net ∆ P=$0.40
Endog net ∆ P=$1.20
Fixed net ∆ P=$1.20
Endog net ∆ P=$2.20
Fixed net ∆ P=$2.20
Note: For the left and the right pairs of distributions (∆P = $0.4 and ∆P = $2.2), the hypothesis of
equal means (with variable variances) is rejected with p < 0.01. For the middle pair, the t-test fails
to reject this same hypothesis.
Figure 3: Simulations overall smoking school Black and school White
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
0
5
10
15
0%
30%
50%
35
D.2 Alternative empirical specifications
This appendix replicates the empirical analysis with an alternative specification where the
price of tobacco is substituted with log income. It is important to note that (a.) ...
Table 10: Parameter estimates (specification including log income)
Utility of smoking
Parameter No Net Data Fixed Net No PE No Tri Model
1 Baseline probability of smoking 0.107∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
2 Income (in log) 0.097∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
3 HH smokesMP 0.096∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
4 Mom edu (HS&CO)MP −0.038∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
5 BlacksMP −0.155∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗
6 Grade 9+MP 0.111∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
7 30% of the school smokesMP 0.086∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ — 0.081∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
Utility of friendships
Parameter No SNet Data Fixed Net No PE No Tri Model
8 Baseline number of friends — — 2.492∗∗∗ 1.779∗∗∗ 2.011∗∗∗
9 Different sexMP% — — −0.701∗∗∗ −0.699∗∗∗ −0.719∗∗∗
10 Different gradesMP% — — −0.871∗∗∗ −0.866∗∗∗ −0.872∗∗∗
11 Different raceMP% — — −0.423∗∗∗ −0.320∗∗∗ −0.504∗∗∗
12 TrianglesMP% — — 0.022 — 0.057∗∗∗
13 φMP — 0.028∗∗∗ — 0.025∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
Note: MP stands for the estimated marginal probability in percentage points and MP% for estimated
marginal probability in percent, relative to the baseline probability. The posterior sample contains
105 simulations before discarding the first 20%. Posterior mean outside of the shortest 90/95/99%
credible sets is indicated by ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ respectively.
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Figure 4: Simulations overall smoking school Black and school White (specification including
log income)
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Table 11: Predicted Smoking Prevalence following Same-race Students Cap (specification
including log income)
Same-race School School Overall p-val H0
cap (%) White Black (Y ) E[Yi] = E[Y0] E[Yi] = E[Yi−1] Yi = Y0 Yi = Yi−1
0 27.0 6.7 16.8 - - - -
10 25.0 8.1 16.7 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
20 21.8 10.2 16.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
30 20.6 11.0 15.8 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.33
40 16.2 14.8 15.5 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.25
50 15.1 15.4 15.2 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
Note: A cap of x% same-race students is implemented with a swap of (100− x)% students. Columns
2, 3 and 4 show smoking prevalence. Columns 5 and 6 show the p value for the hypothesis of mean
equality in overall smoking (t-test for mean equality; t-stat for unequal variances). Columns 7 and
8 show the p value for the hypothesis of equality in distribution of overall smoking (two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). Both test cannot reject the hypotheses for equal mean/equal distribution
of the overall smoking for two cases: (a.) same-race cap 0% and same-race cap 10%, (b.) same-race cap
20% and same-race cap 30%, (c.) same-race cap 30% and same-race cap 40%, suggesting non-linear
relation between school composition and overall smoking.
Table 12: Pairwise tests distribution overall smoking (specification including log income)
Same-race
0 10 20 30 40 50
cap (%)
0 1.00 (1.00)
10 0.12 (0.12) 1.00 (1.00)
20 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 1.00 (1.00)
30 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.18(0.33) 1.00 (1.00)
40 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.01) 0.02 (0.25) 1.00 (1.00)
50 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.02(0.01) 1.00 (1.00)
Note: Each cell shows p value for the hypothesis of mean equality in overall smoking between a pair
of scenarios (t-test for mean equality; t-stat for unequal variances). Each cell shows in parenthesis
the p value for the hypothesis of equality in distribution of overall smoking (two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test). For example both tests cannot reject the null when comparing equality in means (and
equality in distributions) of overall smoking between scenarios same-race cap 0% and same-race cap
10% (p-value for both is 0.12).
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Table 13: Spillovers(specification including log income)
Campaign (%) Smoking
Predicted effect Actual
Multiplier
proportional effect
- 44.0 - - -
1.0 40.0 0.4 3.2 7.4
2.5 38.1 1.1 5.8 5.3
5.0 34.6 2.1 9.4 4.2
10.0 31.5 4.1 12.5 2.8
20.0 25.5 8.2 18.4 2.1
30.0 21.1 12.3 22.9 1.7
50.0 11.3 20.5 32.7 1.5
Note: The first column lists the alternative attendance rates. The second and third columns display
the smoking rate and the change in smoking rate respectively if the decrease would be proportional
to the intervention, i.e. computes a baseline without peer effects. The last column computes the ratio
between the percentage change in the number of smokers and the attendance rate.
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